Introduction
People still believe in digital security. They talk about long passwords, password managers, 2FA via SMS, 2FA via email, 2FA via applications like Aegis, Authy, Google Authenticator or Microsoft Authenticator, and even hardware security keys like YubiKey, SoloKeys, Google’s Titan Security Key, OnlyKey or Feitian. But all of this is an illusion.
When we talk about intelligence organizations, none of these methods work. They operate at the root level, with total access to smartphones, computers, routers and even satellites. They control servers, network infrastructures and all digital accounts — emails, social networks, clouds, financial services, government databases and even platforms the average user doesn’t even know exist. Everything is open.
The user believes they control their accounts because they have a long password, because they use a manager, because they enabled 2FA or because they bought a hardware security key like a YubiKey or similar. That protection may fool common criminals, but for those who already dominate the system at its deepest level, it’s irrelevant. What seems unbreakable to the average citizen is transparent to intelligence.
Total Access of Intelligence Organizations
Intelligence organizations can access every digital account in the world. We’re not just talking about emails or clouds. Control extends to financial services, government databases and also entertainment and consumer platforms like Netflix, Hulu and others that people don’t even think to include in this discussion. Anything that depends on a server, a network or a device is already mapped and open.
The myth of security collapses here: no login holds up. No password, no 2FA, no hardware security key. When there is root access on the server and infrastructure control, access is direct. The user believes they are protected by authentication layers, but those layers are ignored because the system was already compromised at the origin.
The key is to understand that it’s not about “cracking” a password or “discovering” a code. It’s about operating at a level beneath that, where the barriers the user imagines simply don’t exist. While people think about long passwords and hardware security keys, intelligence organizations go straight through the core of the system, open the account and extract everything without any obstacle.
Absolute Root: Invisible Control
Root is the deepest level of access to a system. Whoever has root controls everything. They can read, write, delete, modify and install anything without being detected. For regular users or amateur hackers, reaching this level is difficult and limited. For intelligence organizations, it’s simple.
They exploit vulnerabilities that never reach the public, dominate operating systems and have direct influence over hardware and software production chains. From smartphones and tablets to computers and home routers, equipment already comes out of the factory compromised, with invisible entry points. The user turns on the device thinking it’s clean, but in reality it’s been compromised since the beginning.
People think they are in control, but they already lost it the moment they connected the device to the network. With any active connection, even minimal, external control is inevitable. Only devices kept totally isolated reduce exposure — but never absolutely.
Long Passwords
People believe that having a long password means security. They think that if they use 16 or 20 characters they’re protected from any attack. That belief comes from the idea that the longer the password, the harder it is to break with brute force.
But when we talk about intelligence organizations, password length is irrelevant. If root access exists on the system, the password is captured the moment it’s typed or used, even before it’s validated. It doesn’t matter if it’s 8, 16 or 20 characters. What seems like a fortress to the user is, for those with access at the origin, just another line of text to collect.
Brute force techniques lose all value in this context. There’s no need to calculate combinations when the system is already open and the password is grabbed directly at the source. The user remains convinced that password length gives them protection, but the truth is that, against root, there’s no difference between a short or long password.
Password Managers
Another common illusion is believing that using a password manager solves the problem. The argument is simple: the vault is encrypted, the user doesn’t need to memorize anything and, in theory, passwords remain protected even if someone accesses the device. But this logic only works against trivial attackers.
When root access exists, encryption no longer matters. The device itself can be instructed to hand over the database and the decryption key. The vault that seemed locked opens as if it was never closed.
In the end, the password manager is nothing more than an extra layer of convenience. For intelligence organizations, there is no barrier: passwords are collected directly at the source, without effort.
Hierarchy of 2FA and Other Methods
2FA is a temporary second password used to log into an account. The mechanism is simple: first you enter your normal password, then you must confirm with an extra code. This code may come via SMS, email, an app like Aegis, Authy or Google Authenticator, or through a hardware security key like YubiKey, SoloKeys, Google Titan, OnlyKey or Feitian. The idea is that even if someone discovers your main password, they still need that second code.
On paper it looks like extra security. In practice, against intelligence organizations, it’s nothing but an illusion. All methods fail. The only difference is the degree of fragility.
The Worst – 2FA via SMS and Email
2FA via SMS is the weakest of all. Messages travel through networks controlled and vulnerable to attacks like SS7, SIM cloning or mass interception. Whoever controls the telecom infrastructure has direct access to the codes.
Email is no better. Servers are already under control, which means every code sent is read at the origin. These are the most useless methods against intelligence.
The Fragile – 2FA via Applications
Apps like Aegis, Authy or Google Authenticator are presented as safe options. But on a smartphone connected to the internet, they’re worthless. These apps store locally the secrets (seeds) that generate the codes. Since intelligence organizations have root access on the device, they can extract those secrets or even download Aegis, Authy or Google Authenticator backups directly. From that point on, they generate all 2FA codes outside the device, in real time.
The user believes only they control the app, but the key has already been copied from the origin. The only way to reduce exposure is to use these apps on a smartphone completely offline, with no Wi-Fi, no mobile data and no SIM card. This may complicate things for amateur hackers, but against intelligence organizations it makes no difference. Access is immediate because they don’t even need to go through the 2FA page — they go straight into the account through the infrastructure.
The Least Weak – Hardware Security Keys
Hardware security keys like YubiKey, SoloKeys, Google Titan, OnlyKey or Feitian are the ones that complicate the process the most. They’re outside the software, and that creates an extra barrier. But it guarantees nothing.
These keys work in a simple way: when the user tries to log into an account, the service sends a request to the key and the key responds with a unique code that only it can generate. This replaces the codes from SMS, emails or apps like Aegis, Authy or Google Authenticator. In theory, the secrets that allow generating that code never leave the key, and for that reason they’re seen as more secure. But this trust depends on the manufacturing and firmware being clean. If the firmware is altered, it can replicate operations, use weak keys or transmit data covertly. If the chip is tampered with in the factory, it can include invisible circuits that allow secrets to be extracted without the user realizing it. The key continues to function and blink as if nothing was wrong, but in the background the secrets may already be replicated and sent to whoever controls the manufacturing or the software.
If the manufacturing or firmware of the key are compromised, it already comes from the factory with invisible backdoors.
And even if it’s clean, it doesn’t protect against access done at the server level. Using a hardware security key to protect a service like ProtonMail doesn’t stop messages from being read. Intelligence organizations control the global infrastructure — servers, satellites, datacenters and telecom infrastructures — even when they belong to private companies selling “security.” For them, the barrier doesn’t exist.
The Last Barrier: Neural Technology
Even if all digital layers failed, there is one form of access that never fails: direct mind reading. Remote Neural Monitoring (RNM) (Link) is the technology that turns the brain into the final target. It’s no longer about invading systems or servers — it’s about invading the nervous system itself.
RNM captures the victim’s brain activity in real time. By reading the visual cortex, operators see exactly what the target sees, as if they were inside their mind in a first-person game. At the same time, they can decipher thoughts the moment they arise, before the person is even aware of them. Emotions, mental images, recalled memories: everything is recorded and interpreted.
No password can resist this, because the code is read the instant it’s thought. No electronic vault or hardware security key creates barriers, because the brain is already mapped and open. RNM destroys the last illusion of privacy: not only are all devices compromised, but the mind itself is no longer a safe space.
The final goal isn’t just accessing digital systems. It’s controlling perception, emotion and human decision.
Conclusion
There is no such thing as absolute digital security. All the methods people trust — long passwords, password managers, 2FA, hardware security keys — are fragile. They may delay amateur hackers, but they have no effect against intelligence organizations.
Root opens all systems. RNM opens the mind itself. The real dispute was never about the password or the email account: it’s about the human being as the total target.
The illusion of digital security keeps people busy with passwords, managers and hardware security keys. But all of this is distraction. Real control is no longer in the accounts or devices — it’s in perception and the mind. The human being has ceased to be the user and has become the very system to be exploited.
September 2025
This article is in English. Read the Portuguese version ⇒ Ler em português